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Is personal currency issued by participants sufficient to operate an economy efficiently, 
with no outside or government money? Sahi and Yao (1989) and Sorin (1996) 
constructed a strategic market game to prove that this is possible. We conduct an 
experimental game in which each agent issues her personal IOUs, and a costless efficient 
clearinghouse adjusts the exchange rates among them so the markets always clear. The 
results suggest that if the information system and clearing are so good as to preclude 
moral hazard, any form of information asymmetry, and need for trust, the economy 
operates efficiently at any price level without government money. These conditions 
cannot reasonably be expected to hold in natural settings. In a second set of treatments 
when agents have the option of not delivering on their promises, a high enough penalty 
for non-delivery is necessary to ensure an efficient market; a lower penalty leads to 
inefficient, even collapsing, markets due to moral hazard. 
 
Keywords: strategic market games, government and individual money, efficiency, 
experimental gaming 
 
JEL: C73, C91 
Revised Draft: January 26, 2010 
                                                 
1 The authors are thankful to Benjamin Felt and Ryan Dunn for their laboratory assistance, and workshop 
participants at the Yale School of Management, the Institute for Financial Management and Research 
(Chennai), Osaka University, Tokyo University, Waseda University, Central University of Finance and 
Economics (Beijing), and a referee and the editor for helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper. 
Financial support by Yale University and the Austrian Forschungsfoerderungsfonds FWF (grant P-20609) 
and the Tiroler Wissenschaftsfonds (grant UNI-0404/557) is gratefully acknowledged.  
Email: martin.angerer@uibk.ac.at, juergen.huber@uibk.ac.at, martin.shubik@yale.edu, and 
shyam.sunder@yale.edu.  
Page 2/43 
 1. INTRODUCTION 
 Whether private money alone is sufficient to run an economy efficiently has been 
a matter of debate for many years. The proponents of an economy without government 
money have argued that if all individuals and institutions were to issue their own debt as 
a means of payment, the market would sort out their reputations and risk associated with 
accepting such paper from different issuers (for example, see Black 1970). Indeed, some 
customs and practices in markets for money and the language of banking seem to be 
consistent with this view. In the City of London, the rates of interest charged in dealings 
with “prime” and “lesser” names are different. In the free banking era in the United 
States, there was an active market for discounting bills issued by hundreds of banks. In 
this paper we report the results of a laboratory experiment and find that the economy can 
be run efficiently on individual credit alone under stringent but unrealistic conditions for 
clearing and delivery.  Relaxing the delivery conditions causes the efficiency to drop 
sharply unless defaults on delivery are punished. 
 Formal modeling of monetary economies as a strategic market game has led to the 
conclusion that government fiat money is not necessary if there is perfect clearing and no 
default (Sahi and Yao, 1989, and Sorin, 1996). Like the Modigliani-Miller’s (1958) 
observation about the neutrality of the cost of capital with respect to leverage, this result 
is valid under conditions that are clearly counter-factual. Given exogenous uncertainty 
and dispersed and imperfect information, a smoothly functioning economy using 
individually created credit lines with no default appears to be institutionally difficult to 
obtain, even if it were logically possible. The problem lies not in the usual economic 
equilibrium models but in the information and evaluation network. Process dynamics, 
trust, and evaluation are core issues in the functioning of the financial system, and these 
are not present in the Black or Modigliani-Miller observations, neither are they modeled 
in our current experiment.  
 There is another fact of life in favor of government money that goes against the 
formal results: No bank—much less an individual—can match the visibility of the 
government which is known to essentially everyone. Historically, at least since the 
Lydians around 630 BC, governments have been involved in issuing money.  
 The use of government money initially became accepted because of the 
government’s reputation and ability to enforce the rules of the game quickly and 
uniformly. Additionally, it expedited and simplified taxation, and as an unintended 
consequence, handed government an instrument to choose heretofore inaccessible policy 
options (e.g., to finance war) and to control the economy in other ways. Private issue of 
money weakens the power of government arising from its control of money.   
 The acceptance of government as well as individual IOUs as money requires an 
expectation that there are plenty of others who will accept the instrument as a means of 
payment. Since there may be little recourse to nonperformance on IOUs issued by 
government or individuals who go bankrupt, accepting such money involves an element 
of trust. The universal acceptability of money issued by stable and trustworthy 
governments may exceed the acceptability of instruments issued by their nearest 
competition—the big banks.2 
                                                 
2 This is amply illustrated by the 2007-9 financial crisis occurring at the time of this writing. 
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 Gold, in spite of its unwieldiness, has longevity and direct commodity value that 
makes it more trustworthy than government-issued paper money, but government money 
may be more trustworthy and generally acceptable than paper issued by banks. Most 
individuals, being virtually unknown to the public at large, would find it difficult to have 
their IOUs accepted as a means of exchange. 
 In international trade, many countries issue their own respective means of 
payment. In an international trade context, each agent is a long-lived bureaucracy with a 
reputation and engages in trades that are settled with considerable time lags. Formally the 
mathematics of the “personal IOUs” game is an abstraction for the study of the statics of 
the n-nation, n-currency competitive international trade model, but for exploring the 
dynamics of this phenomenon it is probably too stripped of the context.    
 There are one qualitative and three quantitative approaches available to adduce 
empirical evidence. The first involves a historical and journalistic approach enhanced 
with some raw or slightly processed numerical data woven into a plausible argument that 
the theory fits the facts. The other three are more quantitative and call for (i) econometric 
methods applied to a statistical representation of some aspects of the ongoing economy, 
(ii) experimental gaming with reward-motivated human agents in a laboratory 
representation of the economy, or (iii) simulation with a computer model of the economy 
populated by artificial agents.  
 We employ a two-pronged approach to examine the theory of money. The first 
step calls for game theoretic modeling of the economy in order to be specific about both 
the model (the rules of the game, information conditions and state space) and the solution 
concept considered. We select two solution concepts: moves chosen by economic agents 
with rational expectations and moves selected by agents with minimal intelligence. These 
solutions provide behavioral upper and lower bounds for what individual agents in the 
economy might do, and we expect the behavior of human subjects in naturally occurring 
and laboratory economies to fall within these bounds.  
 The second step in our work is the use of experimental gaming to compare and 
contrast the behavior of the experimental economy with the outcomes suggested by the 
two considered solutions of the game theoretic models.  
 A firm foundation for a viable theory of money and financial institutions calls for 
formulation, investigation and sensitivity analysis of many special models. Following our 
modeling of the simplest of structures, many variants of the model call for 
investigation. We select two sets of experiments. The first shows that under extremely 
strong conditions on a market clearing mechanisms government money is not needed.  
The second shows that as soon as one considers deviations such as a possibility of 
strategic failure to deliver on one’s promises, efficient individual issue of credit cannot be 
sustained without considerable enforcement.  
 We are well aware that development of reputation is a key to a pure credit 
economy. It is extremely difficult to develop in vitro experiments to catch the long term 
in vivo aspects of the development of reputation and trust and we have left out this 
important aspect money for future research.  
 Until the work of Sahi and Yao (1989) and Sorin (1996) there was no known 
mathematical model and proof of the existence of an equilibrium with individual issue of 
a personal credit money. These results can be easily extended to games with a finite 
horizon and given terminal conditions. This is what we do here. 
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 We follow the more or less standard approach to experimentation where one 
attempts to simplify and control as much as necessary. In particular the use of gaming 
forces us to specify precisely oft-ignored institutional features such as bid size, number of 
individuals in a market, discrete versus continuous time and what is meant by a static or 
dynamic model.  
 To understand money, not only do we need to distinguish between static and 
dynamic equilibria, but also be precise about what is meant by dynamic disequilibrium.3 
In the work presented here the institutions provide constraints (and hence guidance) on 
the motion of financial instruments. The selection of terminal conditions introduces a 
simplified form of expectations; like rational expectations this permits the prediction of 
the dynamic equilibrium.  
 In the laboratory, we used a computer to perform two tasks; (1) to calculate the 
exchange rates among the units of personal credit issued by individual agents, and (2) to 
function as a clearinghouse. In Treatment 1 the computer did not permit individuals to 
renege or to go bankrupt, and thus from developing a bad reputation. In Treatment 2 
subjects were not prevented from reneging on their promises and thus a market 
breakdown became a possibility. The computer helped us cleanse the lab economy of the 
frictional and informational issues so we could examine the ‘personal IOUs’ model in 
absence of such alternative explanations for the prevalence of government money.  
 Briefly, in absence of moral hazard this mechanism  yields efficiencies as high or 
higher than the three market games studied in Huber et al. (2010), confirming that an 
economy with individual credit is logically as well as behaviorally feasible and efficient. 
We show that a key claim in competitive market theory, that government money is not 
needed to achieve efficient exchange, can be established experimentally as well as 
theoretically. However, when reneging on promised delivery is possible, markets are less 
efficient and may even break down, depending on the penalty for non-delivery. Thus, 
efficiency appears to depend on ideal contract enforcement, credit evaluation and clearing 
arrangements in the economy. These are implicit in the model as well as treatment 1 of 
the laboratory set up, but not in treatment 2, where failure to deliver is possible.  
 Our basic approach is minimalist, while at the same time it acknowledges that 
there are dozens, if not hundreds of experiments that need to be done in the development 
of economic understanding. Here we make no pretence at great generality. We 
specifically tackle one basic problem and having answered it we consider some 
extensions. Sahi and Yao (1991) and Sorin (1995) were able to mathematize the idea of 
every individual generating their own credit in a decentralized manner but utilizing a 
globally centralized clearinghouse to calculate exchange rates. This contrast with the 
trading post model of a strategic market game where the sole use of a commodity money4 
or a government money does not require centralized clearing as every market clears by 
itself (see treatments 1, 2 and 3 in Huber, et. al. 2010). We show that relatively 
unsophisticated students and minimal intelligence players will perform fairly closely in 
accord with the theory. When failure to deliver is not possible (in treatment 1), or the 
                                                 
3 A formal definition of disequilibrium poses many difficulties as was indicated by the perceptive article of 
Ragnaar Frisch 1936. We do not attempt a coverage of this point here. 
4 The money could be a direct consumption good such as bags of tea, bales of tobacco, cigarettes or bars of 
salt (see Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik, 2003). The distinction between the asset and the flow of services 
obtained from the asset is discussed there. 
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penalty for such failure is sufficiently high (treatment 2a). However, with low or zero 
penalty the market tends to breaks down (treatments 2b and 2c). When the number of 
subjects is reduced from ten (5+5) to four (2+2), oligopolistic effects play a much larger 
role and as a result efficiency is significantly lower. 
 In Section 2 we discuss the model, touching on problems such as the multiplicity 
of equilibria and the selection of a numeraire. Section 3 gives the experimental setup and 
Section 4 the results. Section 5 presents the design and results for economies with moral 
hazard, and Section 6 contains our concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Model 
 A strategic market is a game in strategic or extensive form, usually representing 
an exchange or exchange and production economy, and is closely related to the general 
equilibrium model of an exchange or exchange and production economy. A basic 
difference between a strategic market game and general equilibrium model is that the 
former provides an explicit mechanism for price formation, the latter does not. The game 
serves as the basis for a playable experiment with full process details given. 
 There are two basic versions of the strategic market game: the ”trading post” and 
the “windows” model. The trading post model is completely decentralized. Imagine m 
trading posts, one for each good.  The manager of each trading post deals only in one 
good. She collects the consignments of that good offered for sale, and the money being 
offered to buy that good, calculates the clearing price and allocations, and transfers the 
traded goods and money among the traders. In contrast the windows model requires a 
centralized agency that may be interpreted as a general clearing house that gathers the 
promises for the consignments of all goods and bids of personal money or IOU notes for 
all goods and  calculates a set of exchange rates that clear all markets among all of the 
individual  credit lines issued by every trader. Thus in order to balance all books the 
clearing house also has to calculate the appropriate exchange rates. We sketch the general 
formal model as follows: Consider a set of n agents and m goods. There are m posts, one 
for each good where each agent i bids quantity of money bmi and offers a quantity of 
goods qmi for sale. Let ti be the exchange rate of i’s IOUs with respect to the numeraire. 






mm ∑∑ =  (1) 
 








i ∑∑ =   (2) 
 
Thus each agent i obtains from the trading post m the quantities m
i




i pbt /  units of good m.  
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 The system is homogeneous of order zero. If a set of prices p and a profile of 
exchange rates t  define an equilibrium, so will λp and λt for any λ>0. 
 The paper of Sahi and Yao (1989) and that of Sorin (1996) establish the existence 
of an active5 non-cooperative equilibrium set of prices and exchange rates and then go on 
to show that as the number of agents trading increases this converges to a competitive 
equilibrium.6 
  The credit issue of some arbitrarily selected agent can be used as a numeraire. The 
clearing house balances all expenditures and revenues for each agent. 
 
2.1. The non-cooperative equilibrium solution 
 In Appendix C the solution is given for the non-cooperative equilibrium of the 
formal sell-all model that serves as the basis for the experiments reported on here.7 For 
the experiment here we assume there are two types of traders, each with n agents, and 
there are two goods. Traders of Type 1 each own an endowment of (a, 0) and traders of 
Type 2 each own (0, a).8 Each trader puts up all of his/her assets for sale and is allowed 
to “print” and bid units of a personal currency to buy each of the two goods.  The reasons 
for having each trader sell all endowed assets are two-fold. First, this market structure 
cuts the size of the strategic actions of each individual to two. Also, it reflects a modern 
economy in which individuals buy virtually all their needs from markets, instead of 
consuming any significant amount of what they produce.  
 A strategy by an individual i is a pair of bids (bi1, bi2), bi1 + bi2 ≤  mi, where  mi is 
the amount of personal IOU s each individual has created. Formally an upper bound is 
needed to construct a playable game that does not lose definition by degenerating into a 
contest of who can name a bigger number. In practice if no bound is set the pathology 
does not occur. In economic reality an upper bound on the creation of an individual credit 
line can be introduced through a cost to the production of the credit. This could be a set 
up cost or a cost in proportion to the size of the credit line issued or both. With the 
invention of coinage a seignorage charge was introduced both to defray the expenses in 
production and policing and as a tax. As a first approximation one could argue that if an 
individual issues 10 or 100 or 1,000 units of personal IOUs or credit line the cost should 
be the same. This suggests that a single set up cost should be charged for the ability to 
issue one’s own credit line. The cost could be in paying out some amount of real 
commodity (such as the individual’s time). But once the permit to issue has been paid for, 
this does not bound the issue. There is nothing to stop the individual from writing a credit 
line for as large a number as he wishes. At this level of abstraction if one wished to be 
                                                 
5 There could be an inactive equilibrium without trade. 
6 The non-cooperative equilibria need not be unique, but in this experiment the conditions were chosen so 
that the equilibrium is unique. 
7 We use sell-all rather than buy-sell described above for simplicity in decision making.  Since all 
endowment of goods are automatically offered for sale, each subject has only a two dimensional decision to 
make, the amount of personal credit to print and how to split it into the bids in each market. 
8 In the experiment, we chose a = 200, except in two settings conducted as robustness checks (T1a_10_nze 
and T1a_4_nze) where we used endowments of 196/4 and 4/196 of goods A and B respectively in order to 
start with non-zero initial payoffs.  
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tidy it is easy to place an upper bound exogenously on the issue size and leave out issue 
costs. 
 Even with an upper bound U on issue, the price level can be anywhere from (0, 
2U/a]. In order to determine a unique price level more conditions must be added.  Our 
experimental results confirm that the price level can be different in each game, as that is 
what we observe. 
 With no more than ten traders in each experimental run, the influence of each 
trader is large enough so that the non-cooperative equilibrium can be distinguished from 
the competitive equilibrium. In payoffs, as shown in Table 1, the difference between the 
competitive equilibrium and the noncooperative equilibrium with 10 (5+5) players is 
about 0.5 percent. The asymmetry in holdings is much larger (about 10 percent). 
Furthermore, in our closed economy the difference between the non-cooperative and the 
competitive equilibria is manifested in income as well as expenditures. Although the 
payoff function is identical across traders, and is symmetric in the two goods, 
endowments are asymmetric—(a, 0) and (0, a). With few traders, purchases from the 
market for the endowed good influence the owner’s income and bring more revenue from 
its sale back to the trader (as compared to purchase of the other good).  Each individual 
has a per-period payoff of the form: ABα  where α is a parameter and A and B are the 
amounts purchased of the first and second good (recall that all goods endowments are 
sold). 
 For purposes of comparison first consider a market that uses a commodity money9 
with a fixed marginal utility as a consumption good, say the marginal utility  =  μ = 1, the 
per period payoff to the individual  becomes ABα  + (M-b), where the last term is the 
retained money balance. As shown in Huber et al. (2010), the presence of a money with 
marginal worth as a consumption good is sufficient to anchor the price level. 
 Table 1 indicates the equilibrium bids and purchases of goods by traders of Type 
1 (i.e., traders with endowment of (a, 0)) for the two goods as the number of traders is 
varied when each trader is endowed with the right to issue 6,000 units of a commodity 
money with constant marginal utility μ = 1.  In competitive equilibrium, each trader bids 
an identical 2,000 units of money for each of the two goods, and buys 100 units of each 
good at a price of 20 per unit, leaving 2,000 units of money unspent. With five traders of 
each type, in the non-cooperative equilibrium the amount bid for the own good is 22 
percent (= (2214-1811)/1811) more than the amount bid for the other (non-owned) 
good.10  
 In the experiments we report here, there is no commodity money to anchor the 
prices. Instead the individuals are given an upper bound on the amount of personal IOUs 
they can issue. Any price level consistent with the given bound (of 6,000 units on each 
                                                 
9 The reason for noting a commodity money is that essentially it serves as an easy way to remove the 
possibility of many equilibria each at a different price level. The fact that the monetary commodity has a 
direct consumption value, and is the numeraire, removes the freedom of choice associated with an economy 
using fiat money or personal credit. Although it provides an interesting price contrast and opens up 
questions concerning the use of a clearinghouse, it is not central to our model or the experiment, and we do 
not develop it further. 
10 In setting T1a_4_nze, conducted as robustness check, each market is populated by only four agents. As a 
consequence the amounts bid for own/other goods in the non-cooperative equilibrium are 2654/1574 and 
thus 69 percent higher for the own good than for the other good.  
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trader in most treatments) would be feasible. Table 1 provides one of the many solutions 
consistent with individual credit.11 
 The level of overall spending is essentially irrelevant, because exchange rates will 
adapt; but the individual allocation of spending to buy goods A and B determines the 
payoff of the agents. As explained above, there is a general equilibrium solution with an 
equal amount of money allocated to both goods by each individual. There is also a non-
cooperative equilibrium where 10 (5 + 5) participants spend 22 percent more on the good 
they are endowed with than on the other good. In both scenarios the overall spending 
level does not matter, as the exchange rates are always set to equalize each individual’s 
spending and income. 
 
2.2 A Continuum of Equilibria 
 A continuum of prices is consistent with the equilibrium distribution of resources. 
The clearinghouse arrangement allows for equilibrium prices to be supported with all 
individuals having different exchange rates. For, example, if each trader has a credit line 
of 6,000; total resources are (200,200) and half bid all their 6,000 (3,000 in each market) 
while the other half bid 3,000 (1,500 in each market) the prices at competitive 
equilibrium would be pA = pB = 30 = (3,000wA+1,500wB)/200 with the relative prices 
being wA = 1 and wB = 2. In this equilibrium each player buys 100 units of each good. 
Suppose now that the second traders each bid half as much, i.e., 750 instead of 1,500 the 
distribution of goods would still be the same and the prices at competitive equilibrium 
would be pA = pB = 30 = (3,000wA+750wB)/200 with wA = 1 and wB = 4. If both traders 
cut their bids in half then because player 1’s currency is the numeraire and by definition 
equal to one, prices would be pA = pB = 15. 
 
2.3 Numeraire 
 When there is a money with a constant marginal utility μi to each individual i, the 
selection of a numeraire is more or less natural; society may fix its price level at one by 
transforming each utility function of  form u(Ai,Bi)+μi (m-bi) to be (1/μi)u(Ai,Bi) + (m-bi). 
When there is a government fiat money an expectation concerning its purchasing power 
in the next period must be given for a price to be attached to it.  
 When there is neither a commodity nor fiat money, the normalization can be made 
to anchor prices by arbitrarily choosing one of the agents and assigning weight w = 1 to 
him. All other weights are then calculated relative to this agent’s weight. This is the 
method utilized in the first set of experiments. Another way of normalizing is to have all 
of the relative weights assigned to all of the agents add up to some constant. 
 
                                                 
11 For the sake of comparability, we present the same solution as in Huber et al. (2008 and 2010).   
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3. The Experiment 
3.1 Setup 
 In operationalizing the game as a laboratory experiment, we utilize individuals to 
play the role of each agent,12 and use an instantaneous clearinghouse mechanism. Each 
agent can issue his or her own credit and knows that prices will emerge in such a way that 
all accounts will balance and that the cost of their purchases will match the revenue from 
their sales with no opportunity for default and no threat to their reputations. 
In separate experiments with (i) human and (ii) minimally intelligent artificial 
agents (Gode-Sunder 1993) we chose a simple setup with ten traders, two goods (A and 
B), and equal (in T1a, T1a_10_nze, T1a_4_nze, T2a, T2b, and T2c) or differing (in T1b) 
upper limits on the personal money each trader could issue. We used the sell-all market 
structure in all treatments. However, while in Treatments 1a and 1b traders did not 
directly control the goods they were endowed with, and all units were always sold, in 
Treatments 2a, 2b, and 2c participants could decide how many of the promised 200 units 
to deliver, with any quantity from zero to 200 possible.  
In all treatments traders received as income the proceeds from selling their 
endowments of goods at the market clearing price (this was also the case in Treatment 2 
irrespective of whether they really delivered them). This can be thought of as payment in 
advance.  
In all treatments five traders were endowed with 200 units of A and zero of B, 
while the other five were endowed with zero units of A and 200 of B.13 In treatments T1a, 
T1a_10_nze, T1a_4_nze, T2a, T2b, and T2c each trader was allowed to issue up to 6,000 
units of personal IOUs each period; in treatment T1b the allowances to print money 
varied – two traders (one each endowed with A or B) were allowed to print 500; 1000; 
2000; 4000; and 8000 units respectively.  
The key distinction between Treatments 1 and 2 is that the latter permitted 
subjects to fail to deliver some or all of the goods promised for delivery. In Treatment 2, 
as in Treatment 1, all 200 units of each participant are up for sale and prices and 
exchange rates are calculated the same way as in Treatment 1. Each individual earns 200 
times the unit price of his endowed good as income. Given the clearance mechanism this 
exactly offsets his expenditures. However, in a second step introduced in Treatment 2 
each participant can decide how many, if any, of his 200 endowed units to actually 
deliver – with zero (complete failure to deliver) to 200 units possible. When deliveries 
fall short of the promised quantities, unit prices and money earnings are not changed, but 
the units actually received are reduced proportionately for all. For example, if 10 percent 
of the promised units are not delivered, each trader receives 10 percent fewer units of this 
good without getting his money for the undelivered units refunded to him.  
Treatments T2a, T2b, and T2c differed with respect to the penalty imposed for 
reneging on delivery of units. In T2a, the penalty was high—5 points per undelivered 
unit—which made it uneconomical to renege in virtually all cases. In T2b, the penalty 
                                                 
12 In one market conducted as robustness check teams of two people play one agent each. 
13 This was relaxed in T1a_10_nze and T1a_4_nze where the endowments were 196/4 or 4/196 of goods A 
and B, respectively. With these non-zero endowments initial payoff was 280 instead of being zero. Still all 
goods were sold through the market. These markets are presented in section 4.2 on robustness checks. 
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was 2.5 per undelivered unit which made it uneconomical for some situations, but not for 
others to renege. In T2c, the penalty was zero, making it individually advantageous for 
everyone to renege. The size of this penalty can be thought of as a parameter of the 
strength and efficiency of the contract enforcement system. We expect that the high 
penalty in T2a should induce a higher level of market discipline and efficiency, while the 
zero penalty in T2c should result in a high level of reneging and therefore an inefficient 
market. In T2b we should expect an intermediate level of reneging and efficiency.  
In each period of each treatment each participant decides how much money to 
“print” to buy goods A and B. The computer, playing the role of a clearinghouse market 
mechanism, constructs a matrix of all the bid amounts and inverts it to calculate prices 
and exchange rates so that (1) the number of units of each good bought and sold in the 
respective markets are equal, and (2) the net cash position of each trader is zero – this 
holds true also in Treatments 2, as each individual receives 200 times the price of his 
good, irrespective of how much she actually delivers.  
 Each period’s earnings for each trader are calculated as ten times the square root 
of consumed units of good A times the consumed units of good B (i.e., the units held at 
the end of the period). In Treatment 1 the consumed units were the number of units of 
each good bought. In Treatment 2 the consumed units of the non-endowed goods were 
the number of units bought; the consumed units of the endowed goods were the number 
of units actually received from the market plus the number of units retained, i.e., not 
delivered.  
Earnings are converted to U.S. dollars at the end of the experiment at a pre-
announced rate. Traders learned about their personal, as well as the market average, 
earnings at the end of each period. All endowments were reinitialized at the start of each 
period (see Instructions in Appendix B). 
 
3.2 Implementation  
 We report the results of laboratory runs of the personal IOUs experiment, and 
compare these results with the outcomes of the sell-all market presented in Huber et al. 
(2010) in which money balance had a constant marginal payoff. From July to November 
2006 three runs for T1a (uniform limits on the amount of money individual subjects 
could “print”) and two runs for T1b (heterogeneous limits on money) were conducted at 
Yale University. Four of the runs (two for T1a and two for T1b) were conducted each 
with ten undergraduate students of different departments at Yale University. Each student 
acted individually and no communication was allowed among them.14 In July 2008 and 
January 2010 the runs of Treatment 1a_10_nze, Treatment 1a_4_nze, and Treatment 2 
(two each for T2a, T2b, and T2c) were conducted at the University of Innsbruck, Austria, 
                                                 
14 One run (T1a_team, presented in section 4.2. Robustness Checks) was conducted with 18 students who 
were primarily undergraduate majoring in economics with a few Masters degree students in management. 
16 of the students were randomly assigned to eight pairs, while the remaining two students participated 
without a partner. This became necessary because two students did not show up as planned. While 
communication between participants was forbidden in the first four runs, the two students in each team had 
to reach a decision together and were allowed to talk. Communication across the teams was not permitted. 
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with an average payment of €21. The recruitment of participants was done with ORSEE 
(Greiner, 2004), and the experiment was computerized with zTree (Fischbacher, 2007).  
 
3.3. Minimally Intelligent Agents  
 A simple decision mechanism is employed here for minimally intelligent (MI) 
traders (Gode-Sunder 1993). Performance of the economy with this simple algorithmic 
agents provides a useful benchmark for comparison against theoretical equilibria as well 
as experimental outcomes from laboratory in which the actual strategies of individual 
subjects are not only complex but also unobservable. Each agent selects randomly from 
its opportunity set defined by the credit restrictions, i.e., the sum of its investments in the 
two goods is uniformly distributed between zero and 6,000. In a second step the sum is 
randomly split between the two goods using a fraction which is uniformly distributed 




4.1 Results of Treatment 1  
In all four runs of Treatment 1 total spending (by all traders) between the two 
goods is balanced with investment in the “own” good, i.e. the good they are endowed 
with, ranging from 49.3 to 51.3. The remaining 48.7 to 50.7 percent were invested in the 
other good. This overall equality was observed throughout the 10-15 periods of the five 
runs, with no systematic change from early to later parts of the runs (see Figure 1 for 
details). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Non-cooperative equilibrium predicts that subjects in Treatment 1 will tend to bid 
more money for their endowed good than for the other good (see Table 1, 2214 for 
endowed good vs. 1811 for the other good). Treatment 1 data are weakly consistent with 
the non-cooperative equilibrium in three of the four runs (see Table 2). Across the four 
runs participants invested 51.2 percent of their money in their own good and 48.8 percent 
in the other good. While this imbalance points into the direction of the non-cooperative 
equilibrium, the spending on the own good is only 5 percent higher than the spending on 
the other good. The traders are therefore closer to the general equilibrium which predicts 
no difference in spending on the two goods, than to the non-cooperative equilibrium with 
a prediction of 22 percent difference. Here only run 1 of Treatment 1a is close to the non-
cooperative equilibrium, while the other three runs of Treatment 1are in general 
equilibrium. This appears to indicate that the competitive equilibrium requires less 
sophistication in strategic thought than the non-cooperative equilibrium. 
Over the 10-15 periods of the four runs, there is no trend in the difference between 
spending on the two goods—there is no indication of either narrowing or widening over 
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time – see Figure 2, where average “symmetry” of investment is shown per period. This 
number is calculated by taking the amounts spent for the two goods and dividing the 
smaller number by the larger. If investment in the two goods is equal “symmetry” is 1; 
otherwise it is lower, reaching zero when only units of one good were bought. This result 
differs somewhat from the sell-all markets examined in Huber et al. (2010) where 
spending for the own good was on average 34 percent higher than spending for the other 
good. We think the difference might stem from the fact that subjects focused on different 
tasks in the two settings: in the pure sell-all markets presented in Huber et al. (2010) they 
had to decide how much of the money given to them should be spent on A and on B, and 
how much should be kept unspent. In Treatment 1 of the present experiment, by contrast, 
they first decide on how much money to print, possibly leaving the distribution of 
spending on A and B as a secondary consideration. Indeed, equal spending for the two 
goods is the most frequent choice made (44.2 percent of all cases). 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
In Treatments T1a and T1b spending limits seem to play only a minor role in the lab 
economies when it comes to earnings. This is because the relative value of IOUs issued 
was adjusted, thus printing and spending 1 unit of personal IOUs for each good is equal 
to printing and spending 3,000 units of personal IOUs for each good. The heterogeneous 
spending limits we set in T1b also seem to have been without much consequence: on 
average between 33 and 78 percent of the maximum allowed amounts were printed, with 
no systematic pattern visible (see Figure 3). E.g. the 33 percent were printed by subjects 
with the second highest spending limit in run 2 of T1b and the 78 percent were printed by 
those with the highest spending limit in run 1 of T1b.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
Again we calculated ‘symmetry’ for each trader for each period, and period-wise 
averages are charted in Figure 2 with different lines for each of the five runs. Observed 
‘symmetry’ ranges from 0.70 to 0.95 and all four runs exhibit a slight but not significant 
upward trend. Compared to the Huber at al. (2010) experiment, the current experiment 
yields significantly higher average symmetry (average of 0.83 versus 0.65 in Huber at al. 
(2010) all sell-all markets, Mann Whitney U-Test, p<0.01).  
 We measure allocative efficiency of the markets by the total number of points 
earned by traders relative to the maximum they could have earned (which is in general 
equilibrium). Efficiency of individual markets ranges from 96.9 to 99.3 percent; mainly 
because most traders invested almost equal amounts in goods A and B. By spending 
almost the same amounts for the two goods most traders ended up with around 100 units 
of each good A and B, earning close to 1,000 points per period. Learning effects are 
limited – mostly because participants made good choices right from the start (see Figure 
4).  
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
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 Another consequence of the equal split of investment between goods A and B by 
most traders is that the dispersion of the earnings of individual traders remains small; 
most participants in all runs earned almost the same number of total points with no major 
outliers.  
 Simulations with ten MI traders yield average earnings of 791 points, average 
spending of 3,000, and ‘symmetry’ of only 0.39. This shows that the market constraints 
alone help achieve a relatively high degree of efficiency even with randomly chosen bids. 
Compared to autarkic earnings of 0, MI traders realize almost four fifths of the CE 
maximum of 1,000. The human traders performed much better though, with average 
earnings around 990. The reason for this difference is that humans chose almost 
symmetric investments (symmetry of 0.83 versus 0.39 for MI agents) which generate 
higher earnings under the payoff function used.  
 
 
4.2 Robustness Checks  
 To gain a better understanding of our results and to test the robustness of the 
setting to treatment changes we conduct three robustness checks. All three are variations 
of T1a. In the first robustness check we replace individual agents by two-person teams 
and find that the results do not change relative to the individual players. In the other two 
robustness checks the initial endowment is changed from (200/0, 0/200) to (196/4, 
4/196), changing the autarkic utility/earnings from zero to 280 points, which is 28 percent 
of the maximum possible in competitive equilibrium. In T1a_10_nze (10 for 10 = 5+5 
agents and “nze” for “non-zero endowments”) the change of endowments is the only 
change as compared to T1a. 
In the third robustness check, T1a_4_nze, is identical to T1a_10_nze, except that 
the number of agents is reduced to four (2+2). In theory (as shown in Table 1) the 
oligopolistic effect should be larger. The evidence supports this prediction. Results for all 
three robustness checks are shown in the same set of figures. 
 
4.2.1 Robustness Check I: Teams, T1a_team 
Over the past few years the question of whether and how teams behave and decide 
differently than individuals has become a widely discussed issue in economics.15 We 
therefore ran one market where teams of two people play the role of each agent.16 As 
seen in Table 2 and Figures 5-7, we do not find any marked differences from the other 
T1a-markets. Efficiency, own-good bias, and symmetry with the team treatment are all 
comparable to the runs of T1a with individuals. 
 
 
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
                                                 
15 See Bosman et al. (2006), Feri et al. (2010), Kocher/Sutter (2005), and Sutter (2009a, 2009b) for seminal 
contributions to this discussion. 
16 Actually eight of the ten agents are two-person teams, while the remaining two agents are played by 
individuals. This was necessary, as two subjects did not show up for the session. 
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[Insert Figure 6 about here] 
 
[Insert Figure 7 about here] 
 
4.2.2 Robustness Check II: non-zero endowments, T1a_10_nze 
 In T1a_10_nze the initial endowment of each subject is either 196/4 or 4/196. 
Given our earnings function, pre-trading (autarkic) utility increases from zero to 28 
percent of the maximum achievable in competitive equilibrium. All other features of the 
experiment and the instructions remain unchanged. We conducted four runs of this 
setting, each with 10 human traders. All markets ran for 15 periods.  
As seen in Table 2 and in Figures 5-7 the results do not vary much from the 
results of T1a. The own-good bias is small again with only 3.3 percent more spent for the 
own good than for the other good. Overall average efficiency at 97.21 percent of the 
maximum is comparable to the efficiency of T1a where it was 96.9 to 99.3 percent. We 
therefore conclude that the stark choice of initial endowments a/0 is robust to changes to 
initial endowments which are bounded away from zero. 
 
4.2.3 Robustness Check III: non-zero endowments and four agents, T1a_4_nze 
 The noncooperative model presented above predicts that the number of players on 
each side of the market should play a major role for the outcomes of the markets. As 
evident in Table 1 oligopolistic effects, like a stronger own-good bias and thus lower 
symmetry and lower efficiency, should be more evident in markets with fewer agents. To 
test this conjecture we conduct T1a_4_nze where only four agents participate—two 
endowed with 196/4 and the other two endowed with 4/196 of goods A/B. The model 
predicts that the own-good bias in these markets should be 68.6 percent and symmetry 
0.59. We conducted eight runs with four subjects each for T1a_4_nze. All markets ran for 
15 periods.  
 The results are presented in Table 2 and Figures 5-7. The results of T1a_4_nze 
markedly differ from the runs of T1a and T1a_10_nze: the own-good bias of 46.3 percent 
is lower than the theoretical prediction of 68.6 but much higher than in any other run. 
Symmetry is lower than in all other runs, and at the average of 0.60 it is close to the 
theoretical prediction of 0.59. As a consequence of uneven spending on the two goods 
efficiency is lower in these markets – from an average of 83.3 percent in round 1 it 
increases over time and reaches an overall average of 92.1 percent. This is significantly 
lower than in the otherwise comparable ten-person setting Ta1_10_nze (Mann-Whitney 
U-test, N=15, p=0.000). We therefore conclude that the theoretical prediction of lower 




4.3 Results of Treatment 2 (Moral Hazard)  
 In the analysis of data from Treatment 2 we focus on the number of units 
delivered—the main point of departure from Treatment 1 in which subjects had no choice 
but to deliver all 200 of their endowed units. We also examine the consequences of the 
delivery choice for efficiency, whether spending patterns differ across the three levels of 
penalties used in T2a, T2b, and T2c, and how they compare with the spending patterns in 
Treatment 1. 
 
4.3.1 Goods delivered 
Figure 8 presents the average number of goods delivered per participant per period. 
Recall that 200 is the promised and the maximum possible delivery. The high non-
delivery penalty of 5 points per unit in T2a ensured that most units (187 on average) were 
actually delivered and this 94 percent rate of delivery remained stable over the 20 periods 
in a run, i.e., the delivery in early and late periods remained essentially unchanged.  
 
[Insert Figure 8 about here] 
  
In Treatment T2b, with an intermediate level of penalty at 2.5 points for each undelivered 
unit, fewer units were delivered on average (119) and this number seemed to drop 
steadily from about 160 in early rounds to about 90 at the end of the runs.  
 Finally, without any penalty for non-delivery, the market came close to a 
breakdown in Treatment T2c. More than 100 units were delivered only in the first period; 
deliveries dropped steadily until they fell below 50 and bounced between 26 and 42 in the 
last seven periods. The overall average of units delivered was only 52 units = 26 percent 
of the maximum. Theory predicts delivery of 200 when μ = 5, delivery of 0 when μ = 0 
and delivery of 100 when μ =2.5. Agents in the MI simulation randomly chose a number 
from zero to 200 and delivered this number. Thus, the average number of units delivered 




Earnings in this game depend on the number of units of the two goods held at the end of 
each period. Efficiency is therefore closely related to trading and the number of units 
delivered. When all units are delivered and everyone’s bid for good A is the same as for 
good B, everyone will buy and consume 100 units of each good and earn the maximum 
possible 1,000 points, yielding 100 percent efficiency for the economy. At the other 
extreme, if nobody delivered any units, everyone would end up with the 200 units he was 
initially endowed with, but no units of the other good. As our earnings function is 
multiplicative in the units of the two goods consumed, the individual payoff and the 
efficiency would be zero.  
Figure 9 presents the period-wise efficiency of the economy for the three treatments T2a, 
T2b, and T2c and MI agents (three lines for the three different penalty levels). In 
Treatment T2a, mirroring the units of goods delivered (see Figure 8), efficiency starts 
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high (close to 100 percent) and quickly settles around 90 percent (the average is 91.5 
percent). The high penalty ensured delivery of most of the goods and yields high 
efficiency. The same is not true for in lower penalty treatments T2b and T2c; in both 
these treatments efficiency falls from about 87 percent in the first period to 55-59 percent 
in the last period. Average efficiency is 71 percent for T2b and 67 percent for T2c.  
In the MI agents simulation efficiency without penalties is 79 percent, but this is reduced 
to 54 when the penalty is 2.5, and 29 when the penalty is 5. Note that efficiency of 
economies populated by MI agents is lower because the asymmetric consumption of such 
agents yields lower payoffs. In addition, efficiency drops with increasing penalty rate 
because the MI agents do not adjust their behavior and end up incurring greater penalties. 
In contrast, human agents are disciplined by higher penalty rates to deliver more of their 
promised amount and incur fewer penalties.   
 
[Insert Figure 9 about here] 
 
4.3.3 Own-good/other-good bias 
 The most striking difference between the two treatments concerns the division of 
money spent on the own and the other goods. Recall that for Treatment 1, non-
cooperative equilibrium predicts a 22 percent own-good bias in spending because higher 
bids will generate higher prices and thus higher cash income from selling the own good 
(see row 5 of Table 1). Treatment 1 data exhibit the predicted bias of the correct sign 
albeit smaller magnitude, and therefore weakly support the theory (rows 1-6 of Table 2).  
With the possibility of reneging on the promise to deliver the own good, subjects need 
not spend the money to try to buy them, and in extreme case, may gain an advantage by 
bidding all their money for the non-owned good. The larger amount of the other good 
bought, together with the undelivered units of the own good, should result in high 
earnings – unless more/most of the traders follow this policy and only few units are 
traded. Treatment 2 data support this prediction: investment in the own good is always 
lower than in the other good (see the lower part of Table 2). The data show a strong 
“other-good” bias that becomes stronger as the penalty for non-delivery is lowered. In 
T2a, spending on the other good is 8.2 percent higher than spending for the own good and 
93.5 percent of promised units are delivered. In T2b and T2c, spending on the other good 
is higher by 38.6 and 47.3 percent respectively, and the proportion of delivered units 
drops to less than a half and a quarter of the promised units respectively.  
In addition to the averages given in Table 2, the six panels of Figure 10 present period-
wise evolution of the proportion of total money bid for own good for the six runs of 
Treatment 2.  In the high penalty Treatment 2a the amount bid for own good is barely a 
shade below the GE prediction of 50 percent in both runs and for all 20 periods. In the 
medium penalty Treatment 2b, the amount bid for the own good is distinctly lower 
throughout, and the gap widens even further in the zero penalty treatment 2c. Thus, 
traders, aware that they will retain some or all of their own goods, invest money mostly to 
buy the other good. These patterns are remarkably stable or even grow over the 20 
periods of each run.  
 
[Insert Figure 10 about here] 
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4.3.4 Symmetry 
In Treatment 1 and Treatment 2a, the amount of money bid for the two goods is split 
close to 50-50 yielding an average symmetry measure of 0.83 in T1a, 0.86 in T1b (see 
discussion in Section 3.3), and 0.84 in T2a, which we consider reasonably close to 1. 
With unequal bids for the two goods in Treatments 2b and 2c, the symmetry measure 
drops sharply to 0.61 and 0.48 respectively (see Figure 11). In the MI simulations 
symmetry is even lower at 0.39, as agents distribute their investment randomly. 
 
[Insert Figure 11 about here] 
 
Figure 12 shows the period-wise symmetry measure of money bid for the two goods for 
three variations of Treatment 2. Symmetry measure remained stable at 0.8 or higher in 
T2a (high penalty), started at 0.7 and gradually dropped to 0.5 in T2b (medium penalty), 
and dropped from 0.55 to 0.35 over the twenty periods of T2c (no penalty). Asymmetry 
in the medium and low penalty treatments increased as more traders decided to bid more 
of their personal IOUs for the non-owned good as they shifted to the practice of 
delivering less of their own good.   
 
[Insert Figure 12 about here] 
 
4.3.5 Money Printed 
We use the term individual IOU throughout this paper, but an equivalent term could be 
money or personal money as it is always accepted in exchange. Similar to what we saw in 
Treatment 1 participants in Treatment 2 printed on average between 40 and 55 percent of 
the maximum allowance of 6,000. Again we see a mildly increasing trend (see Figure 
13). However, as discussed earlier, the total amount printed is not important; this 
proportion of the money printed bid for each good is the important consideration in this 
economy. 
 
[Insert Figure 13 about here] 
 
5. Discussion and Extensions   
5.1 Simplicity 
Building formal mathematical models frequently requires ruthless simplification by 
abstracting away from the details of the environment under the assumption that the 
outcome is robust to variations in such details. Since even subtle variations in 
environment may affect the outcomes, the propriety of such abstraction is settled, 
ultimately, through successive empirical observation of varying environments. As a 
starting point of this process, we have opted for symmetry and simplicity in the lab 
environment to compare its outcomes with the predictions of theory. A significant 
deviation between the two will call for revisiting the theory.  
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5.2 What is a Financial Instrument? 
When one tries to introduce money or credit into an economic model one has to reconcile 
abstraction with institutional reality.  As many forms of money and the credit system are 
manifested in information flows the exact experimental representation is difficult. For 
example consider a game in which payments are made in (1) coins issued by the 
government; (2) paper bank notes issued by the government; (3) a credit line issued by 
the government and utilized by the issue of checks up to a limit; (4) personal checks 
issued by individuals with no bound on size; and (5) ciphers typed into a computer 
system that recognizes them as a means of payment. All of these different physical 
instruments serve as a means of payment, but at some micro level they can be 
distinguished. They generate different costs and call for different means and levels of 
surveillance. In the experiments here we use ciphers entered into a computerized system 
which is already set up to recognize all individuals separately. 
 
5.3. Tatonnement or others 
Walras referred to tatonnement probably because this method was used by the Paris 
Bourse for trading of stocks. Here a different and simultaneous clearing method is used. 
With two trader types and two commodities tatonnement will converge to equilibrium. 
With three, as the Scarf (1960) example has shown, the tatonnement will not converge. 
Instead of tatonnement, we rely on a simultaneous clearing mechanism. 
 
5.4 A question of Credit   
 In the world around us credit is used extensively to bridge problems in timing of 
resource flows. In these experiments the complex, but natural features of time and credit 
do not appear. We could introduce them fairly easily by considering preferences and 
endowments such that the traders wish to alternate in levels of consumption. This, in turn 
calls for the construction of a loan market that is not done in this paper as it would 
introduce problems that can be dealt with separately. 
 
5.5 Failure to Deliver, Reputation and Default 
In considering credit issue of the variety present in the free banking era when the notes of 
different banks sold at various discounts reflecting their reputation, it would be desirable 
to have an experiment that reflected this reputation. The basic experiments here do not 
reflect reputation because the individuals are aggregated in such a way that they are 
anonymous. While we have allowed failure to deliver in Treatment 2, a more 




The theoretical analysis of strategic market games indicates that an economy can attain a 
competitive outcome with individually issued credit lines alone, without fiat or outside or 
commodity money. These models also incorporate certain strong abstractions from most 
details observed in actual trade: (1) no transaction costs, (2) a perfect clearinghouse that 
balances accounts every period, (3) no intertemporal credit, (4) no possibility of a default, 
denying traders the opportunity to breach trust. Laboratory experiments presented here 
were designed to replicate the conditions postulated in such model economies 
(Treatments 1), or allow failure to delivery in goods with or without penalties 
(Treatments 2).  
 In the treatments without failure to deliver the clearinghouse balances all accounts 
each period, and rules out the many accounting problems associated with intertemporal 
trade. The combination of a powerful market mechanism plus a perfect clearinghouse 
puts enough structure on the game to prevent non-correlated, or at best weakly correlated 
behavior at mass scale to go far wrong. The sizes of the simple strategy sets are 
sufficiently constrained that markets populated with even minimally intelligent agents do 
reasonably well in aggregate.17 In three robustness checks we find that neither the 
replacement of individuals by two-person teams, nor the use of non-zero initial 
endowments changes results in any noticeable fashion. However, a reduction in the 
number of agents (from ten to four) leads to significantly stronger oligopolistic effects 
including lower efficiency. 
Since the design of our first treatment corresponds almost exactly to the model 
(with all its abstractions from real phenomena), it yields little insight into what would 
happen under more general conditions when one or more of these assumptions were 
relaxed. Treatment 2, where failure to deliver was possible, proved very insightful. It 
revealed that high-enough penalties for moral hazard ensured high delivery rates and thus 
the efficient functioning of a market. However, lower or zero penalties led to more units 
withheld and consequently much lower efficiency.   
 Our results confirm the considerable power of the market structure in promoting 
efficient allocation when reputation is given as perfect. We also saw that efficiency 
crucially depends on high enough penalties when moral hazard is possible. The key claim 
that government money is not needed to achieve efficient exchange can be established 
experimentally as well as theoretically; but the implicit utopian assumptions concerning 
reputation, contract adherence and clearing efficiency stress the importance of contract 
enforcement, credit evaluation and clearing arrangements in the economy. 
Both theory and experimentation can now verify that in an ideal financial environment 
personal IOUs are sufficient for trade efficiency. The experimental and observational 
questions remain as to how these results are influenced by more realistic considerations 
of reputation and credit evaluation, contract enforcement and clearing arrangements. 
                                                 
17 An implicit assumption in these models has been an emphasis on the role of the markets and the clearing 
house in promoting the efficient allocation of goods of known value. The important role of finance and 
markets as devices to evaluate items of uncertain worth has not been reflected in this experiment. As the 
tasks become more complex involving a mixture of evaluation of the quantitative and qualitative, we 
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2 2653.51 1573.72 1.6861 4227.23 1772.77 21.14 125.54   74.46   96.68 
3 2382.02 1698.17 1.4027 4080.19 1919.81 20.40 116.76   83.24   98.59 
4 2273.52 1767.29 1.2864 4040.81 1959.20 20.20 112.53   87.47   99.21 
5* 2213.79 1810.88 1.2225 4024.67 1975.33 20.12 110.01 89.99 99.50 
6 2175.72 1840.80 1.1819 4016.52 1983.48 20.08 108.34 91.66 99.65 
7 2149.25 1862.58 1.1539 4011.83 1988.17 20.06 107.15 92.85 99.74 
8 2129.75 1879.13 1.1334 4008.88 1991.12 20.04 106.25 93.75 99.80 
9 2114.78 1892.14 1.1177 4006.92 1993.08 20.03 105.56 94.44 99.85 
10 2102.92 1902.62 1.1053 4005.54 1994.46 20.03 105.00 95.00 99.87 
many 2000.00 2000.00 1.0000 4000.00 2000.00 20.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
*Number of subject pairs in the laboratory experiment. In robustness check III (T1a_4_nze) the 
number of players on each side is 2; in all other sessions it is 5. 
Money endowment = 6,000 units per trader 
Goods endowment = (200,0) for one member and (0,200) for the other member of each pair of 
traders in all sessions except in robustness checks II and III (T1a_10_nze and T1a_4_nze) where 
the endowments are (196,4) and (4,196), respectively. 
 





Spending for the 
own good 
Spending for the 
other good 
Own-good-bias* Own-good-bias 
(as %age of other 
good)** 
T1a, run 1 54.3% 45.7%    8.6%  18.8% 
T1a, run 2 50.0% 50.0%    0.0%    0.0% 
T1b, run 1 52.3% 47.7%    4.6%    9.6% 
T1b, run 2 51.0% 49.1%    1.9%    3.9% 
Avg. T1a 52.2% 47.9%    4.3%    9.4% 
Avg. T1b 51.6% 48.4%    3.3%    6.8% 
T1a_team 50.7% 49.4%    1.3%    2.6% 
T1a_10_NZE 50.8% 49.2%    1.6%    3.3% 
T1a_4_NZE 59.4% 40.6%  18.8%  46.3% 
Treatment 2     
T2a, run 1 49.4% 50.7%   -1.3%   -2.6% 
T2a, run 2 46.4% 53.6%   -7.2% -13.4% 
T2b, run 1 42.3% 57.8% -15.5% -26.8% 
T2b, run 2 33.9% 66.2% -32.3% -48.8% 
T2c, run 1 34.2% 65.9% -31.7% -48.1% 
T2c, run 2 34.9% 65.1% -30.2% -46.4% 
Avg. T2a 47.9% 52.1%   -4.3%   -8.2% 
Avg. T2b 38.1% 62.0% -23.9% -38.6% 
Avg. T2c 34.5% 65.5% -31.0% -47.3% 
     
*Own-good-bias:  the percentage spent for the own good minus the percentage spent for the other 
good.  

















































































Figure 3: Average Amount of Money Printed per Period as a Percentage of Maximum Allowed in 
























Figure 4: Average points earned as a percentage of the maximum possible in the experimental runs of 





























Figure 5: Investment in the own good as a percentage of total investment in robustness checks I to III 












































Figure 7: Average points earned as a percentage of the maximum possible in the experimental runs of 























































































































Average amount of money printed in treatments 2
T2a, pen 5 run 1
T2a, pen 5 run 2
T2b, pen 2.5 run 1
T2b, pen 2.5 run 2
T2c, pen 0 run 1
T2c, pen 0 run 2
 




Average earnings per period as percentage of maximum 
 
vertical-axis: points earned, horizontal-axis: period 






This is an experiment in market decision making. The instructions are simple, and 
if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you will earn more money, which 
will be paid to you at the end of the session. 
 This session consists of several periods and has 10 participants. At the beginning 
of each period, five of the participants will receive as income the proceeds from selling 
200 units of good A, for which they have ownership claim. The other five are entitled to 
the proceeds from selling 200 units of good B. In addition each participant will have the 
right to print and pay up to a maximum of 6,000 units of your own “personal” currency to 
buy goods A and B.  
During each period we shall conduct a market in which the prices per unit of A 
and B will be determined. Since different participants may print different amounts of 
“personal” currency, the prices of goods A and B in different currencies will generally be 
different. All your units of A (or B) will be sold at this price (in your personal currency), 
and you can buy units of A and B at this price with your “personal” currency. The 
following paragraph describes how the price per unit of A and B will be determined.  
 In each period, you are asked to enter the amount of cash (units of your 
“personal” currency) you are willing to print and pay to buy good A, and the amount you 
are willing to print and pay to buy good B (see Figure 1) during the current period. The 
sum of these two amounts cannot exceed the maximum amount you are allowed to print 
during the period (6,000 units of currency). If the currency amounts you enter, or the sum 
of these two amounts exceeds the maximum permissible limit of 6,000 units, the program 
will give you an error message. You must reduce the amounts to proceed to the next 
stage. Please note that how much currency you print is your own choice.  
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Figure 1: Screen 1, Currency offer 
 
The computer will consider the money offered by every participant for good A. It 
will also calculate the total number of units of good A available for sale (1,000 as we 
have five participants, each with 200 units of good A). The same procedure is repeated 
for Good B. The computer will then calculate the prices of goods A and B, in units of the 
“personal” currency of each participant, so that the following conditions are satisfied: 
(1) For each trader, the proceeds from sale of goods A and B  equal the 
amount of “personal” currency printed and offered to buy goods A and B 
(see the net cash statement in figure 3). 
(2) For each, good A and B, the total number of units offered for sale is equal 
to the total amount bought at the market prices. 
Note that since different traders may print different amounts of their “personal” 
currency, the price of goods specified in units of the “personal” currency of 
Units you are endowed with at 
the beginning of the period 
Type in how much personal 
money you print to buy goods A 
and B 
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different traders may be different. For example if Trader 1 prints more currency 
than Trader 2, each unit of Trader 1’s currency may buy fewer goods than each 
unit of Trader 2’s currency.  
The amount of currency you earn by selling the units of Good A (or B) given to 
you will be equal to the amount of currency you printed and offered to buy goods A and 
B, and your net balance of currency will be zero (see (3) in figure 3. 
If you offered to pay mA units of your “personal” currency for good A, and mB 
units of currency for good B, and the prices of goods A and B (in units of your personal 
currency) are pA and pB respectively, you get to buy (and consume) cA = mA/pA units of 
good A and cB = mB/pB units of good B. 
The number of units of A and B you consume, will determine the amount of 
points you earn for the period: 
Points earned = 10* squareroot of (cA.*cB). 
 
Example: If you buy 100 units of A and 25 units of B in the market you earn  
10* squareroot (100 * 25) = 500 points.  
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Non-Delivery of Promised Units and Penalty 
 
• After the announcement of the prices and the distribution of goods, you have the 
option to deliver less than the full promised quantity (200) of the goods you are 
endowed with. If you deliver less, the following consequences follow: 
• You get to keep the goods you did not deliver and therefore earn more points. 
• Non-delivery means that there are fewer units of the good on the market, and 
therefore all buyers receive proportionately fewer units compared to what was 
announced.. For example, if one trader delivers only 100 units good A while the 
other four deliver all 200 of their units, only 900 units of this good are on the 
market (instead of 1000)  and each trader will receive only 90% of the units he 
paid for. 
• All payments are made in advance of delivery with no recourse. This means that 
(1) sellers get paid for all 200 units even if they do not deliver the full amount; 
and (2) buyers pay the full price for the units they were supposed to get even if 
they do not get all the promised units.  
• Penalty of Non-Delivery. For each unit you do not deliver, 5/2.5 points are 
deducted at the end of this period. (See the following two examples) 
 
Because of the amount you printed you receive 120 units of good A and 90 of good B  
your earnings are therefore 10* (120*90)0.5=1039. You decide to keep 10 units of your 
good and deliver 190. Therefore you have more goods and receive  10* 
((120+10)*90)0.5=1082. But for each unit you did not deliver a point deduction of 2.5 
points is executed  your final earnings are therefore 1082-10*2.5=1057 points. 
 
You receive 70 units of good A and 110 of good B 10* (110*70)0.5=778. You decide to 
deliver only 100 units of good B you are endowed with and keep the other 100 units. As a 
result each trader receives only 90% of the original distribution; naturally also you get 
only 0.9x110=99 units from the market. You keep another 100 and therefore have 199 
units  10* (70*199)0.5=1180 points. But for each unit you did not deliver 2.5 points are 









Figure 2: Delivery decision 
Prices for good A and B 
Units of A and B you would get 
if everybody fully delivered the 
goods he is endowed with. 
Points you would earn if 
everybody fully delivers his 
goods. 
Your decision how many of 
your 200 units you want to 
deliver to the market. 
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How to calculate the points you earn: 
 
The points earned are calculated according to the following formula: 
Points earned = 10 x squareroot (cA * cB) 
 
To give you an understanding for the formula the following table might be useful. It 
shows the resulting points from different combinations of goods A and B. It is obvious 
that, that more goods mean more points.  
Points Earned When You Consume Varying Amounts of Goods A and B 
 Units of good B you buy and consume 
 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 250 354 433 500 559 612 661 707 750 791
50 0 354 500 612 707 791 866 935 1000 1061 1118
75 0 433 612 750 866 968 1061 1146 1225 1299 1369
100 0 500 707 866 1000 1118 1225 1323 1414 1500 1581
125 0 559 791 968 1118 1250 1369 1479 1581 1677 1768
150 0 612 866 1061 1225 1369 1500 1620 1732 1837 1936
175 0 661 935 1146 1323 1479 1620 1750 1871 1984 2092
200 0 707 1000 1225 1414 1581 1732 1871 2000 2121 2236








250 0 791 1118 1369 1581 1768 1936 2092 2236 2372 2500
Examples:  
1) If you buy 50 units of good A and 75 units of good B, then your points earned are 
= 10 x squareroot (50 * 75) = 610.  
2) If you buy 150 units of good A and 125 units of good B, then your points earned 




After each period a summary table (see figure 3) is displayed. On this table you can 








Figure 3: Summary table
Here you can see how many 
points you would have earned 
with fully delivery and how 
many you really earned. Also 
the number of points deducted is 
displayed. 
Summary for good A 
in the current period 
Summary for good B 
in the current period 
Points earned in past periods 
Average points of all traders 
earned in past periods 
Your points accumulated 
over all periods 
Prices of A and B in past 
periods 
Consumption of A and B in 
past periods 
Total delivery of A and B to 






1. What will you trade in this market?  
2. How many traders are in the market? 
3. How are your total points converted into euros? 
4. Are you allowed to talk, use email, or surf the web during the session?  
 
Questions on how the market works 
5. What is your initial endowment of good A at the start of each period? 
6. What is your initial endowment of good B at the start of each period? 
7. What is the maximum number of currency units you are allowed to print in a 
period? 
8. What is the maximum amount you can offer to buy units of good A? 
9. What is the maximum amount you can offer to buy units of good B? 
10. What is the maximum amount you can offer to buy A and B combined? 
11. What happens to the units of A (or B) in your initial endowment? 
 
Profits and Earnings 
12. Indicate whether each of the following statement is true or false. 
13. For each participant, the amount of “personal” currency received from sale of the 
endowment of goods (200 units of either A or B but not both) will be exactly 
equal to the amount of personal currency offered to buy goods A AND B. 
14. The total number of units of goods A bought by all participants is exactly equal to 
the total number of good A endowed to all participants.  
15. The total number of units of goods B bought by all participants is exactly equal to 
the total number of good B endowed to all participants.  
16. Each unit of your “personal” currency has the same value (purchasing power) as 
each unit of the “personal” currency of the other participants. 
17. If you offered 2,000 to buy good A and the price (in your “personal currency”) is 
20, how many units do you buy? 
18. If you offered 2,500 to buy good B and the price (in your “personal” currency) is 
10, how many units do you buy? 
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19. You offered 300 units of your “personal” currency to buy A and 200 units to buy 
B. The prices are 2.5 for A and 2.0 for B respectively.  
a. How much do you earn from selling your 200 units of A? 
b. How many units of A do you buy? 
c. How many units of B do you buy? 
20. If you bought 150 units of A and 125 units of B, what are your earnings in points 
for this period? 
 
























Specific Solution to Non-Cooperative Equilibrium for Sell-All 
 
Notation 
birj =the bid of individual i (i=1,…,n) of type r (r=1,2) in market j (j=1,2) 
α = utility function scaling parameter 
p j= price of commodity j 
m = initial money holding of each trader 
(a,0) = initial holding of goods of type 1 
(0,a) = initial holdings of goods of type 2. 















and similarly for Player 2. 
The calculation for the sell-all model requires to solution of the two equations derived for 
each trader from the first order conditions on the bidding in the two goods markets. By 
symmetry we need only be concerned with one type of trader. 
 






















and can utilize this to calculate Table 1. 
 
The model in this paper generates the same real goods solution as the sell-all with the 
modificaton involving the clearinghouse weights of individual currencies. This solution 
applies when all of the weights equal one. Without further calculation we may adjust the 
solution for different exchange rates by observing that the balance equation in the new 
problem has the amount of money issued by an individual times its exchange rate always 
equal to the amount of money used by an individual in the old problem. 
 
 
 
